Indonesia’s Evolving Role in Postwar Gaza
Indonesia is emerging as a critical, albeit complex, player in international efforts to stabilize postwar Gaza, a role underscored by the United Nations Security Council’s recent endorsement of a U.S.-drafted peace plan. This resolution, which authorizes an International Stabilization Force for Gaza and establishes a “Peace Board” chaired by President Donald Trump to oversee reconstruction, received 13-0 votes in favor, with Russia and China abstaining, signaling a broad international desire for a neutral actor. The world’s most populous Muslim-majority nation, Indonesia holds a unique position, unentangled in the regional rivalries that often complicate Middle Eastern diplomacy.
President Prabowo Subianto’s administration has actively positioned Indonesia for this role. Defense Minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin confirmed on November 14 that President Subianto had instructed the military to prepare a contingent of up to 20,000 soldiers for a potential Gaza mission, with a specific focus on medical and construction capabilities following a meeting with the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Jordanian Armed Forces in Jakarta. Any deployment, however, would necessitate a formal UN authorization, a point consistently emphasized by the Indonesian Defense Ministry.
Challenges and Domestic Constraints
Despite Indonesia’s diplomatic ambitions, the practicalities of such a mission reveal significant hurdles. Dinna Prapto Raharja, an associate professor of international relations and executive director of Synergy Policies, a Jakarta-based think tank, highlighted a stark gap between “Prabowo’s high-profile diplomacy and Indonesia’s actual readiness.” Raharja noted a lack of public debate or detailed planning within Indonesia regarding the Gaza peacekeeping mission, indicating a foreign policy approach heavily reliant on personal diplomacy rather than institutional preparation through scenarios or military consultations.
The security environment in Gaza poses unprecedented risks for Indonesian troops, far exceeding the challenges of previous UN peacekeeping operations. “The situation is incredibly tricky,” Raharja observed, citing potential risks from armed Palestinian factions beyond Hamas, ongoing Israeli military operations, and the high probability of “misunderstandings with US forces or intelligence” in a congested operational space. Such an environment could see Indonesian soldiers inadvertently caught between various armed actors, complicating their humanitarian and stabilizing objectives.
Domestically, Indonesia’s involvement is tempered by a populace largely sympathetic to the Palestinian cause and historically unfamiliar with Israeli perspectives. Giora Eliraz, from Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies, highlighted the widespread negative perceptions of Israel among Indonesians. This sentiment was evident in late October when Indonesia refused visas for Israeli athletes to participate in the World Artistic Gymnastics Championships in Jakarta, citing opposition from the Indonesian Ulama Council and potential public outrage. This followed a similar refusal in early 2023, which cost Indonesia the right to host the FIFA Under-20 World Cup, underscoring the strong anti-Israel sentiment that has deepened amid the Gaza conflict.
International Perspectives and Mandate Complexities
The international community’s expectations for Indonesian leadership contrast with the complex realities on the ground. Hamas, for instance, rejected the UN plan, calling it an attempt to impose “international guardianship” on Gaza [un.org](https://www.un.org/unispal/document/special-rapporteur-report-gaza-genocide-a-collective-crime-20oct25/). The Palestinian Authority, while calling the resolution “a first step,” acknowledged significant unresolved issues, including the crucial question of post-conflict governance in Gaza.
Arab governments, while supporting the principle of a stabilization mission, have expressed reluctance to deploy their own troops. This stems from fears of legitimizing Israeli control or inadvertently becoming targets for Palestinian fighters, which could compromise their standing in the broader Arab world. For Washington, Indonesia represents a viable option, aligning with a long-standing U.S. reluctance to commit large ground forces abroad. Chuck Freilich, a former Israeli deputy national security adviser, noted, “Washington hasn’t been willing to deploy large forces abroad for decades,” making Jakarta an attractive partner, especially given Turkey’s unacceptability to Israel.
However, Israeli cooperation hinges on the command structure of any stabilization force. Israel would likely demand an oversight role, potentially with U.S. commanders, rather than accepting leadership from a Muslim-majority nation. Critics also point out that the mission in Gaza would likely be a “peace-enforcing mission,” requiring combat operations against armed groups, not merely traditional peacekeeping. “I do not see any country eager to take it on,” Freilich stated, underlining the high stakes involved.
Adel al-Ghoul, a Palestinian political analyst, emphasized that the success of any international force depends on its perceived function and behavior on the ground. Indonesia’s lack of diplomatic ties with Israel and its consistent support for Palestinian statehood give it an initial advantage. However, this legitimacy is fragile. Al-Ghoul warned, “People in Gaza want aid, reconstruction, and human security, not guardianship. Any mission that appears to serve outside agendas will fail immediately.” If Indonesian troops are perceived as enforcing Israeli security interests or restricting Palestinian movement, they risk alienating the very population they aim to assist.
The Path Ahead
Indonesia’s potential contribution could extend beyond military personnel. Eliraz’s analysis highlights the unique role of Indonesia’s robust Muslim civil society, particularly its networks of Islamic schools and charities promoting a tolerant, pluralistic interpretation of Islam known as “Islam Nusantara.” This “soft power” could be instrumental in combating religious extremism in Gaza, offering an alternative to Hamas’s ideology. Yet, realizing this potential might necessitate direct cooperation with Israel on security vetting and operational coordination, creating a diplomatic quandary given Indonesia’s principled stance against diplomatic relations until Palestinian statehood is achieved.
The contradiction between Indonesia’s internal planning limitations and the international community’s growing expectation for its central role remains a critical challenge. While Indonesia has experience in relatively stable peacekeeping environments like Lebanon, Gaza presents an active combat zone with a potentially hostile populace. This necessitates a careful and comprehensive approach. As the world navigates the complexities of postwar Gaza, the ultimate success of any stabilization effort hinges on genuine consultation with Palestinians. “Indonesia must talk more with the Palestinians,” Raharja concluded. “At the end of the day, we’re supposed to be helping them, so they must be center stage in the defense of their territory.”
